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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN
ABORTIONS COMMITTED OUTSIDE IRELAND
M. J. FINDLAY*
The legislative provisions which make it an offence to procure a
miscarriage unlawfully or assist in the unlawful procurement are to be
found in sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861 (1). Section 59 states that:
"Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or
other noxious thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever,
knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or em-
ployed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman,
whether she be or be not, with child, shall be guilty [of an offence]
and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... [to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding five years.]"
As recently as 1979, the Oireachtas reaffirmed its acceptance of the
1861 provisions as encapsulating the law on abortion in the Republic.
The Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 made this clear (2):
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising
a) the procuring of an abortion
b) the doing of any other thing the doing of which is prohibited
by section 58 or 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861."
That Act also amended the sections of the Censorship of Publications
Act 1929 regulating the publication, display, distribution and sale of
written material "which might reasonably be supposed to advocate the
procurement of abortion or miscarriage" (3), so as to continue the
censorship ban on pro-abortion literature. The Act of 1929 defined
printed matter which referred to ". . . drugs, medicines, appliances,
treatments or methods for procuring abortion or miscarriage" as being
of an "indecent or obscene character" (4). The amendments made by the
Health (Family Planning) Act merely did away with any reference in the
earlier Act to the prevention ("or unnatural prevention") of conception,
thus retaining the bulk of the original sections in force and transferring
the control of contraception to the 1979 Act.
The Censorship of Publications Act 1946 conferred powers on the
Censorship Board to prohibit the sale and distribution of books and
*Reid Professor of Criminal Law, Criminology and Penology, Trinity College, Dublin.
(1) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94.
(2) S. 10.
(3) Censorship of Publications Act 1929, s. 16(1), as amended by Health (Family
Planning) Act 1979, s. 12(1).
(4) Censorship of Publications Act 1929, s. 17(1), as amended by Health (Family
Planning) Act 1979, s. 12(2).
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periodicals which contain written material advocating the procurement of
abortion or miscarriage (5). These remain untouched by the 1979 Act. It
simply transfers the responsibility to regulate written material relating
to contraception to the Minister for Health (6).
It would appear from section 59 of the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861 not only are the principal parties involved in the operation
liable to criminal prosecution but also those who assist in the procuring
of the miscarriage. Those who counsel the practice may also incur such
liability. In recent years the most common way for an Irish woman to
obtain an abortion has been to leave the Republic and obtain such an
operation in Britain, where the restrictions imposed on the medical
profession with regard to performing operations are far less onerous. Up
until 1967 the law affecting abortions in England and Wales was sub-
stantially similar to that which exists presently in the Republic. This,
however, was radically changed by the Abortion Act of that year. Now,
what may be a lawful medical operation in England may be a criminal
offence in the Republic. How then would the Irish courts view secondary
parties to such extra-territorial activities?
Before discussing this, however, it is important to be clear on what
constitutes the criminal procuring of a miscarriage in Ireland. The central
question for anyone attempting to interpret the relevant legislation in
Ireland is what is meant by "unlawfully procuring a miscarriage". It is
logical to infer from the wording of such an offence that the legislature
envisages situations where abortions may be lawfully carried out. But
nowhere in the Offences Against the Person Act is reference made to the
conditions under which a miscarriage may be lawfully procured. The Irish
courts may not accept that the use of the term "unlawful" in section 58
implies that "lawful" procuring of a miscarriage is the necessary corollary
of such an offence. They may prefer to interpret the section as prohibiting
abortions generally. However, should they do this, it would be difficult
to explain the specific inclusion of the condition that the miscarriage may
be procured "unlawfully". It would not be satisfactory to dismiss it as
surplusage. Nor would the courts be able to simply sever the word "un-
lawful" without substantially affecting the meaning of the section. Any
attempt at severance would, I suggest, cause the whole section to fall.
"Unlawfully" prefaces verbs like "use" and "administer" in sections
58 and 59 no less than six times, and, as such, is an integral part of the
offences created by these sections (7).
(5) Censorship of Publications Act 1946, ss. 7 and 9.
(6) Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, s. 12(3) (4).
(7) Even if the courts were to say that to read "unlawful" as implying the existence of
the corollary (lawful abortions) would be contrary to the express intention of Art. 41
of the Constitution, this would not justify the severance of the word "unlawful",
or an interpretation of the section which ignored its effect. If s. 58 is inconsistent
in its present form with the Constitution then it will be void.
The very controversy caused by the term "unlawful", and the uncertainty it
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In England, the notion of an "unlawful" abortion must be construed
in the light of the Abortion Act 1967. No offence is committed in England
or Wales if a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner
provided that:
(a) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the
mother's life or injury to her physical or mental health or that
of any existing children of her family greater than if the preg-
nancy were terminated (8), or
(b) where there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it
would suffer from some physical or mental abnormality as to
be seriously handicapped (9).
Two doctors practising in an approved hospital must make the deter-
mination of whether a case comes within the above-mentioned cate-
gories (10).
It would appear that the only situation where a doctor in the Republic
could be regarded as lawfully terminating a pregnancy is where the life of
the mother is in immediate danger. However, even this condition is not
char. In Bourne's case (11) the Central Criminal Court in England was
fa'ed with the issue of how a doctor was to determine whether it was
la' vful to terminate a pregnancy. Consideration was given to the proviso
to the offence created by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which
prohibits the killing of any child which is capable of being born alive. The
proviso referred to the death of the child being caused in good faith and
for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother. There was no
such proviso set out in section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act,
but MacNaughten J. took the view that because the word "unlawfully"
was used in that section, it imported the meaning expressed by that proviso
and that section 58 must be read as if the words making it an offence to
use an instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage must be qualified
by a similar proviso. The court in this case also conceded that there is no
clear line of distinction between a danger to the health and a danger to the
life of the mother. This notion of danger does not mean the instant death
of the mother, but such as may be anticipated by the doctor. The doctor's
determination of the danger must rest on "reasonable grounds", formed
from an "adequate knowledge" of the probable consequences of the
continuance of the pregnancy. If the doctor honestly believes that the
creates, is surely reason enough for the drafting of legislation to clarify s. 58, or its
replacement by legislation which stipulates the extent of the prohibition in the
offence.
(8) When determining the effect a continued pregnancy may have on the mother or
her existing child, the doctor may take account of the mother's actual or reasonably
foreseeable social and economic environment: Abortion Act 1967, s. 1(2).
(9) Abortion Aet 1967, s. 1(1).
(10) This requirement may not apply in an emergency situation where an abortion is
immediately necessary to save the mother's life or to prevent grave personal injury
to her physical or mental health: Abortion Act 1967, s. 1(4).
(11) [1939] 1 K.B. 687, [1938] 3 All E.R. 615.
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continuance of the pregnancy would make the woman "a physical and
mental wreck", then his actions in procuring the miscarriage are directed
towards preserving the life of the mother (12).
Whether the Irish courts would so define the conditions of a lawful
abortion or so widely construe the meaning of "A danger to the life of the
mother" is open to debate. The matter has not been argued before a
superior court in the Republic and, therefore, it is far from clear when the
termination of a pregnancy would be seen as lawful in the Republic. It is
evident, however, that the situations where abortions are lawfully carried
out in the United Kingdom offer a far greater opportunity for Irish
women, requiring such an operation, to have their needs satisfied outside
this jurisdiction.
Participation in the crime under Irish law
Persons whom the law considers to be participants in a crime are
those who commit the act itself and, in addition, those not having taken
part in the actual commission of an offence, but who may nevertheless be
liable through their connection with it. The participants in the offence
itself may be principals in the first degree (the actual perpetrators) or
principals in the second degree (those who are present "aiding, abetting or
assisting the commission of the offence"). An accessory before the fact
is one who "aids, abets, counsels, or procures" the commission of the
offence, without being physically or personally present. When one knows
an offence has been committed and "receives, comforts, harbours, assists
or maintains" any of the participants, one may be liable as an accessory
after the fact (13).
This paper is primarily concerned with the liability (or otherwise) of
aiders and abettors who are not present at the commission of the offence.
Secondary parties to abortions may be especially those who assist the
woman in some way to leave the Republic and obtain the operation, but
we must also consider those who "aid" and "abet" after the miscarriage
has been procured.
Liability of secondary parties
The question of the criminal liability of such secondary parties to an
abortion procured overseas is complicated by the fact that the law in the
Republic may not be identical to that which is in force where the operation
is performed. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, for example, the
(12) The interpretation of the precondition for saving the life of the mother was extended
in the case of R. v. Newton & Stungo [1958] Crim. L.R. 469. This case also deals
with the issue of the doctor's "good faith" in determining whether the precondition
exists. It was deemed important that the doctor have a bona fide honest and
reasonable belief that the life or health of the mother was in danger.
(13) These four categories of participation only apply with respect to felonies. As for
misdeineanours, all four degrees of complicity are assimilated into one, with the
fourth degree carrying no culpability. Other participants may be tried and punished
as if they were a principal in the first degree.
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situations where a lawful abortion may be carried out are certainly more
numerous than is the case in the Republic. Thus, it must be determined
whether one can aid and abet an act, the commission of which would
comprise an offence in Ireland but might not offend the criminal law of
the jurisdiction in which it was perpetrated.
Before facing this problem, however, we need to be clear on the
elements of participation necessary to establish the criminal liability of
secondary parties. In order that a person be so convicted, the prosecution
must prove
(i) that the accused assisted or encouraged the commission of the
principal offence; -
(ii) that the principal offence was in fact committed; and
(iii) that the accused had the intention to aid in its commission.
Some problematic issues to confront the prosecution would include:
the existence of an intention to aid or encourage, as well as a knowledge
of the circumstances of the offence (14); the nature of the assistance and
encouragement provided; and the extent to which complicity prior to the
act may verge on incitement or conspiracy.
Incitement
It is that final issue which introduces another element affecting the
liability of secondary parties. The word incitement is really self-explanatory
but it includes advice, encouragement and authorization as well as
persuasion by threats. Encouragement may be given expressly or may be
implied from conduct.
The inciter may be guilty of an offence even though the crime itself
is not committed. In these circumstances, he is not an accessory to the
substantive offence because there is no consummated offence. If, on the
other hand, the substantive offence is committed, the inciter becomes a
party to it as an accessory. The act of incitement is the same whether the
crime is committed or not.
When dealing with the question of secondary parties' liability through
complicity with an offence ultimately committed in another jurisdiction
and which does not transgress the laws of that jurisdiction, the charge of
incitement may be equally as problematic as one of aiding and abetting.
The projected activity to which the incitement relates will not be an offence
where it occurs, nor will it occur within the first jurisdiction (in our
problem, the Republic), where it may form a substantive offence to which
the incitement may be attached as an inchoate offence.
Inchoate offences to be completed outside the jurisdiction
A central authority on the commission of an inchoate offence within
one jurisdiction to commit the substantive offence abroad, is the case of
(14) See National Coal Board v. Gamble [19591 1 Q.B. 11 as to the extent and specificity
of such required knowledge, also R. v. Bainbridge [1959] 3 All E.R. 200.
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Board of Trade v. Owen (15). That case held that a conspiracy to commit
a crime abroad is not indictable in England unless the contemplated crime
is one for which an indictment would lie in England. The House of Lords
took the view that, though the conspiracy in question was to be regarded
as a conspiracy to obtain a lawful object by unlawful means rather than a
conspiracy to commit a crime, no indictment for such a conspiracy would
lie in England, since the unlawful means and the ultimate object were both
outside the jurisdiction.
If a conspiracy were alleged in the Republic between the principal
and secondary parties to an abortion proposed to be carried out legally
in England, the essential elements to establish that conspiracy may not
exist. Board of Trade v. Owen could be distinguished from such an abortion
situation. Although an indictment may lie in the Republic for the procur-
ing of such an abortion locally and for any associated conspiracy, the
alleged conspirators would not be conspiring to commit a crime abroad.
In Owen's case the object of the agreement was clearly criminal.
It could not even be suggested that secondary parties to the abortion
were in collusion to commit a lawful object by unlawful means, provided
that they complied with the requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 for a
lawful abortion. If this was the case, both the "assistance" and the act
itself would be lawful in the second jurisdiction. The "means" (whether
unlawful or not) and the ultimate object may both arise outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Republic. The alleged object of the conspiracy could not have
been carried out in Ireland, it might also be argued. The motivation for
obtaining the operation outside the Republic is to avoid illegality at home,
rather than to engage in crime abroad.
The general principle is that jurisdiction over inchoate crimes
appertains to the state that would have jurisdiction had the crime been
consummated (16). It is not usually the case that a.conspiracy would be
punishable in this country, the agreement being to violate the laws of
another country (17) Despite the fact that a conspiracy is considered to
be completed when the agreement is formed, it is vitally bound up with
the substantive offence which forms the object of that conspiracy. If this
substantive offence is to be carried out in another jurisdiction, it would
require the courts of the Republic to take account of foreign laws when
(15) [1957] A.C. 610.
(16) It is interesting to reflect on the rule of international law adopted by certain con-
tinental countries and England (with respect to specific offences such as murder
and bigamy committed within the "Commonwealth") that a state has jurisdiction
over crimes against its laws, committed by its nationals overseas.
(17) The unusual case of Mulcahy v. The Queen (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306, might be viewed
as authority for the contrary. In that case a conspiracy formed in Ireland "to stir
up certain foreigners and strangers and certain citizens of the United States of
America and persons resident in America, with force to invade part of the United
Kingdom" (to win lieland) was seen as triable within the United Kingdom.
However, there were other charges for conspiracies with purely local treasonous
objectives, which were also heard at the trial, and these may have strengthened
the court's resolve to hear the charges.
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faced with the issue of conspiracy, an approach, it is surmised, which
they will not be inclined to take.
In D.P.P. v. Doot (18) the respondents formed a plan to smuggle
drugs into the United States by way of England. The original agreement
for the venture had been made in Morocco. The drugs were discovered at
Southampton, and the respondents were charged with conspiracy to
import dangerous drugs. At the trial it was contended that the court had
no jurisdiction to try the case because the conspiracy had been entered
into abroad. However, the House of Lords took the view that although
the conspiracy was complete as a crime when the agreement was made, it
continued in existence so long as there were two or more parties to it,
intending to carry out the design. Thus, the English courts had jurisdiction
to try the offence if the evidence revealed that the conspiracy, wherever
and whenever formed, was still in existence when the accused were in
England.
However, once again the case law deals with a conspiracy which had a
criminal object and unlawful means to achieve it. The conspiracy would
not have "continued to be in existence" unless it possessed these
characteristics. In Doot, the "means" and "object" were unlawful in both
England and the jurisdiction in which the agreement was to be fulfilled. No
matter when it is completed, or where it may be prosecuted, an inchoate
offence is inextricably linked to some future substantive criminal offence.
The logic flowing on from the Owen case is that courts will assume
responsibility to prosecute a conspiracy entered into abroad to commit a
crime here. This is despite the general policy with regard to matters of
venue that where a conspiracy remains inchoate, it might be seen as more
convenient, from the point of view of evidence, to prosecute in the locality
where the agreement was formed. Brisac's case (19) considered the problem
of conspiracies entered into on the high seas. Despite the fact that all the
acts that constituted the conspiracy were committed out of the jurisdiction
of the common law, and only the object and completion of the conspiracy
were to operate on shore, the court decided that it had jurisdiction to try
the charges because the final step of the common purpose (i.e., the delivery
of the false vouchers) was to be done within the jurisdiction. That final
act in pursuance of the purpose of the conspiracy was an offence in the
place where the vouchers were delivered. So again the need for an ultimate
offence within the jurisdiction that prosecutes is apparent despite the
conspiracy being in "another place".
Conspiracy is the widest of the inchoate offences, and the general
rules affecting its prosecution will be transposed to incitement and attempt
to commit crimes. The question of attempt was discussed in R. v.
Harden (20). The court in that case held that section 9 of the Criminal
(18) [1973] A.C. 807.
(19) The King v. Brisac & Scott (1803) 102 E.R. 792.
(20) [1962] 2 W.L.R. 553. See commentary in [19621 Crim. L.R. 248.
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Procedure Act 1851 did not apply because the "offences were in fact
completed" (21). However, the true reason for the failure of the attempt
in this case seems rather that the accused intended to commit an act which
was no offence under English law.
Where a court has no jurisdiction on a charge of an extra-territorial
substantive crime, the jury could not convict an attempt committed
within the jurisdiction to commit such an extra-territorial crime (22).
All the above-mentioned cases show instances of the courts' reluctance
to act on criminal activities committed extra-territorially. How much more
will the courts of the Republic be reluctant to entertain a prosecution for
an inchoate offence where the extra-territorial activity does not constitute
a crime in the other jurisdiction!
In discussing the case of H.M. Advocate v. Semple (23), where the
charge was one of attempted abortion by supplying abortifacients from
Glasgow to someone in England, Gordon states the following (24):
"The supply (of abortifacients) could be only criminal if the abor-
tion was criminal and if the abortion was to take place in a country
in which the abortion was legal, the supply would not be criminal
or at any rate, would not amount to attempted abortion . . . the
supplier's guilt was accessory to the guilt of the person who actually
tried to procure the miscarriage; now if that person committed no
crime by trying to procure the miscarriage .. .where such acts are
not criminal, how could the supplier be guilty of being an accessory
to that 'crime'."
Even if the attempted abortion were criminal in the second jurisdiction,
the accessory in the first country would be committing a crime extra-
territorially.
When is the inchoate offence completed
It is generally agreed that an inchoate offence will be complete prior
to the execution of the substantive offence which is its object. In practice,
they are crimes of themselves without the commission of this object.
In the case of conspiracy, the issue of when the offence is complete
is of cardinal importance, as we saw in D.P.P. v. Doot. If the conspiracy
exists at the time the agreement is formed, then a crime may be created
far removed from the substantive offence. Thus, the general rule relating
to the reluctance to prosecute such inchoate crimes can be viewed as an
exception to the usual principles of extra-territorial jurisdiction over
completed criminal offences.
Earlier, I have stated that the convention is that inchoate offences
are normally prosecuted, if at all, in the jurisdiction where the substantive
(21) See Treacy v. D.P.P. [1971] A.C. 537.
(22) See State v. Snow (1912) 83 N.J.L. 14.
(23) 1937 J.C. 41.
(24) Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland (1967), p. 89.
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offence will be committed. However, if the conspiracy is a complete offence
in the first jurisdiction, why should it not be prosecuted there? It has
been held that where the conspiracy charged is to "cause a public mis-
chief" (25) in the local jurisdiction, or is to injure a citizen of that state
by causing damage to him abroad, the conspiracy may be prosecuted
locally.
In the abortion situation, it might be said that any agreement to
procure an abortion outside the Republic may have the unlawful purpose
of evading and preventing the course of justice in the Republic. If this
was accepted as an object for criminal conspiracy and the conspiracy
was seen as complete as to agreement, then would the Irish courts not be
correct in hearing such a charge?
The conspiracy might also be punishable if the conspirators con-
template the illegality may be performed either here or abroad, even though
it is performed abroad. In the case of the abortion example, the woman
goes outside the jurisdiction to avoid illegality. The alternative is funda-
mentally different.
Conspiracy might further be successfully alleged when directed
towards the commission of another more general object. Shaw's case (26)
is authority in England for the existence of the offence of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals. Were the Irish courts to entertain the existence of
such an offence in Irish law, a prosecution might conceivably be upheld
against parties who conspired to procure an abortion, provided that such
an agreement constituted a corruption of morals and that it was formed
in circumstances which were seen as sufficiently public in nature.
Despite these particular examples, an inchoate offence would not
ordinarily be successfully prosecuted in Ireland where the abortion is
procured in England. The alleged offence is completed and yet does not
constitute a crime in the external territory. A conviction would only
result where either the object of the inchoate offence would be criminal
in the second jurisdiction or where the "means" used to achieve the
object were, of themselves, unlawful.
Secondary parties to an extra-territorial offence
Where the abortion is actually carried out, the question concerning
criminal liability centres on the secondary parties. Though useful to
introduce the problem of extra-territoriality, the speculation on whether
or not the assistance provided to an illegal operation would constitute
an inchoate offence does not influence such liability. Once the substantive
offence has been consummated, the issue of inchoate offences is of little
consequence. The liability of the secondary party is attached to the
(25) Note, however, that in D.P.P. v. Withers [1975] A.C. 842 the House of Lords held
that there is no separate or distinct offence known as a conspiracy to effect public
nuisance.
(26) Shaw v. D.P.P. [1962] A.C. 220.
96
Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland
completed offence. To determine the liability of secondary parties in any
criminal charge, it must be remembered that, unlike individuals involved
in inchoate offences, secondary parties are not guilty of subsisting crimes
on their own account. They may only become liable in relation to a crime
committed by another. In that respect, the actions of the persons they
assist, and the way these actions are viewed by the law, are crucial to the
criminality or otherwise of secondary parties.
If the abortion procured in England were criminal, a secondary party
can be punished in that state, even though he was not within its territorial
jurisdiction at the time when the crime was committed or when he gave
his assistance. The parties who gave assistance in the Republic of Ireland,
for example, became criminally liable for an illegal abortion performed in
England because as secondary parties they are not guilty of self-subsisting
crimes on their own account, but of participation in a crime committed
by another (27).
On the other hand, courts in the Republic would not be able to hear
charges against the secondary parties to a crime which was ultimately
committed outside the jurisdiction, because there is no crime under Irish
law to which anyone can be a secondary party. If the action is not seen as
criminal within the home jurisdiction, then there is no secondary criminal
liability here. The proper procedure for the external territory would be
to have those who assisted the action extradited to face prosecution in
that jurisdiction. The law of complicity only applies to crimes committed
against local law.
In relation to the present abortion example, however, I would agree
with Glanville Williams, when he states that it could "hardly be imagined
that our courts would punish arrangements for doing something in a
state that would be lawful there" (28).
The penal law of one nation must be seen as being purely territorial,
and this would be subverted if the law of conspiracy or the prosecution of
secondary participants could be used to give it world-wide operation.
Criminalizing the non-criminal?
If the courts of the Republic were to uphold prosecutions for
1) aiding and abetting those who obtain lawful abortions outside
this jurisdiction; or
2) assisting, inciting or conspiring to assist those who intend to
obtain such abortions in England or Wales,
they are effectively extending the criminal law of Ireland to cover actions
which occur in another jurisdiction that are deemed by the laws of that
jurisdiction not to be criminal. Such an expansion of the jurisdiction must
(27) N.B. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed.), p. 129.
(28) Glanville Williams, "Venue and the Ambit of Criminal Law" (1965) 81 L.Q.R.
530. This was approved as a correct statement of law by Fenton Atkinson L.J. in
R. v. Robert Millar Ltd. [1970] 2 Q.B. 54 at 73.
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amount to a challenge to the sovereignty of an external territory to
determine what is criminal and what is not, within its jurisdiction (29).
When discussing this in an English context, Glanville Williams
submitted (30):
"that the mere fact that Englishmen agree in England to do some-
thing abroad that will be lawful abroad but that would be punish-
able if done here, should not make them guilty of conspiracy even
though their purpose is to evade the English prohibition".
If the Irish courts wish to punish these evasions of local prohibitions
they can only do so through the statutes of Ireland (31) which have extra-
territorial effect. As no such statutes exist with respect to abortion, the
courts of the Republic cannot cure this deficiency by manipulating the
notions of complicity or inchoate liability.
(29) Glanville Williams, "Venue and the Ambit of Criminal Law", 81 L.Q.R. 530.
(30) Ibid., at 537. This view is supported by R. v. Walkem (1908) 5 W.L.R. 857, where the
court in British Columbia held that the accused could not be punished in Canada
when she submitted herself to an abortion in the U.S.A., which was not, as such,
punishable in Canada.
(31) An example of extra-territorial criminal legislation can be seen with respect to
homicide (Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 9) and bigamy (Offences
Against the Person Act 1861, s. 57).
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